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Abstract: We experimentally demonstrate a method for in-service optical physical layer security 
monitoring with vacuum-noise sensitivity that can detect a 1% fiber tapping attack at 50km without 
classical security loopholes. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, optical fiber networks are advancing rapidly to meet increasing capacity demands. Attack management and 
link security have become increasingly important for critical optical communication infrastructure. In addition to data 
encryption methods, classical physical layer security protection relies on active fiber monitoring techniques which are 
generally based on power monitoring and active diagnostics of the network [1], e.g. by measuring the optical mean power, 
or using optical time domain reflectometry (OTDR). However, such classical methods have vulnerabilities and security 
loopholes in practice [2]. They can, for example, be compromised by an intercept-resend attack. A sophisticated fiber tapping 
attack could perturb the fibre transmission by less than 1% [1], making real-time high-precision monitoring of the link power 
at the required precision challenging and costly. 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proven to be able to provide unconditional security for communication in terms 
of semantic security. This is guaranteed by quantum physics, such that legitimate users can detect the presence of any 
eavesdropper on the quantum communication channel [3]. This indicates that quantum physics can also provide physical 
layer security to a classical communication channel. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a quantum alarm (QA) 
monitoring system [4] which can provide in service surveillance of an optical network.  
2. System set-up 
In a method similar to that used in pilot tone systems, the link security is assured by sending special signals which here 
comprise continuous variable quantum states, i.e. weak coherent states modulated at the quantum level. They are sensitive 
to measurement in the channel so that, as any unauthorized measurement introduces extra noise, it can be detected. Both the 
quantum signal excess noise and channel loss can thus be precisely estimated and monitored by real-time processing of the 
quantum signals. This process is similar to the parameter estimation step in continuous variable (CV) QKD systems, which 
requires use of more than half the quantum states to characterize the link security and estimate the secure key rate. However, 
in a QA system, we employ all the quantum states simply for security monitoring. 
 
Figure 1: Block diagram of quantum monitored optical link 
A diagram of the experimental set up is shown in Fig. 1.  Here we randomly switch between sending classical modulated 
signals and quantum modulated signals using time division multiplexing (TDM) over the same channel with the same 
timeslot durations. For the classical signals, we encode random data using an on-off keying modulation scheme. For the 
quantum signals, we employ a two-state modulation scheme [5] that randomly sends one of two quantum states (namely 
state alpha and state beta) with the signal amplitude displaced to match the classical zero level. Hence, an eavesdropper 
cannot distinguish the quantum signals from the classical signal zero level.  
For the signal preparation, we employ a single amplitude modulator to modulate both quantum and classical signals. A 
variable optical attenuator is used to emulate the optical channel with adjustable loss. At the receiver, a 50/50 splitter is used 
to direct half of the received signals for classical signal detection, with the other half transmitted to the quantum receiver, 
which comprises two balanced homodyne detectors to measure both x and p quadratures of the signals. The quantum and 
classical measured results are both recorded by a personal computer (PC) for post-processing. In addition, for our initial 
demonstration, half of the power from the CW laser at the transmitter is pulsed and then connected to the quantum receiver 
as a local oscillator for homodyne measurement. In practice, this will be achieved by using a separate laser with the same 
wavelength at the receiver, similar to the architecture used in classical optical coherent communication systems and the local 
local oscillator CVQKD system proposed in [6]. In our tests, the system slot repetition rate is set as 25MHz, with the classical 
data rate set at 1Gbps. 
3. Results and summary 
We demonstrate our system performance under a correlated jamming attack. These attacks are especially demanding for 
classical attack detection techniques that are based on monitoring optical power as it maintains the optical power while 
monitoring part of the information. To implement the attack, we split off 1% of the signal and also re-inject light from 
another laser to maintain the same optical power before and after the attack.  Hence, we combine both a 1% fibre tapping 
and also a jamming attack, while keeping the link power constant.  
As can be seen from Fig.2, we perform the correlated jamming attack between data point 100 to 300. In Fig 2a we present 
the transmitted quantum signal, together with a smoothed 30 point moving average, for clarity. There is an obvious drop in 
the monitored quantum signal  during the attack, despite the mean optical power remaining constant. The measured 
transmission is still decreased as the injected light cannot compensate the quantum signal. The transmission has a much 
larger fluctuation during the correlated jamming attack, since the measured standard deviation during the attack is about 
0.009, i.e. 0.4dB, while that of a safe channel is less than 0.0015, i.e. 0.04dB. To avoid false alarms, we trigger the alarm 
when the moving average whose fluctuation is only 0.05% crosses the 1% threshold (at point 110). Based on the safe channel 
fluctuation, we can be 99.99% sure that it is caused by an eavesdropper. 
    In addition, Fig 2b shows the mean quantum excess noise, which increases from 0.14 shot noise units (snu) to 0.64 snu 
during the correlated jamming attack. This is equivalent to the OSNR decreasing by 1.5dB. We set the alarm threshold at 
the excess noise of 0.5 snu which is triggered at point 117. However, in practice, due to the sporadic nature of this attack, 
this extra noise and temporal BER drop is very hard to be detected classically. Nonetheless, the increase it causes in the 
quantum excess noise is easy to detect as it increases to nearly 5 times its original value. The quantum excess noise is 
calculated by removing the trusted noise from the measured quantum signal variance.  
 
Figure 2: (a) Transmission monitoring result showing the moving average falling below the 1% trigger level (b) Quantum excess noise 
monitoring result  
4. Conclusions 
We demonstrate a Quantum Alarm which uses quantum states to monitor the classical channel security and detect a 
correlated jamming attack that is difficult to be detect by classical means. Our technique relies on quantum measurements 
and does not exhibit classical security loopholes., For example it outperforms classical loss monitoring,  having a sensitivity 
of better than 0.04dB (at 50km) compared to 0.4dB using classical methods [7].  
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